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In little more than ten years, terrorism and counter-terrorism have emerged as one of the most visible and important features of the cultural and political landscape. While terrorism was an occasional subject of national and international interest prior to 9/11, it is now ubiquitous across the world and its influence can be detected in nearly every dimension of social life, from its almost daily presence in the news media to films, fiction, video games, public policy, political campaigning, policing, security practices, travel, immigration, education, research, advertising, banking, foreign aid, and a great many other areas of modern society. In short, few citizens of any major Western country in particular can be unaware of terrorism or remain unaffected to some degree by the extensive security measures and public information campaigns designed to prevent and respond to it.
	In this context, the heightened academic interest in terrorism since 9/11 is unsurprising and is simply part of a broader interest in one of the most important subjects of public policy today. In addition to the tremendous growth of the Terrorism Studies field (see Jackson 2012), studies on the nature, causes, effects, and counter-measures to terrorism have proliferated in international relations, security studies, history, psychology, sociology, criminology, law, cultural studies, risk studies, anthropology, geography and many others. In fact, it is now a cliché to note that in the ten years following 9/11, more works on terrorism have been published than in all the years prior to the terrorist attacks. One study found that 14,006 articles about terrorism had been published between 1971 and 2002, with 54% of the articles published in 2001 and 2002 (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley 2006: 491-92). Another found that 2,281 non-fiction books with the term terrorism in the title had been published between September 2001 and June 2008, while in comparison, only 1,310 such books had been published in the decades prior to 9/11 (Silke 2009: 34).
An important part of this extremely large and diverse literature has focused on the way in which terrorism and counter-terrorism have been discursively constructed as objects of social knowledge and how a dominant ‘discourse of terrorism’ has arisen in Western societies at the present historical juncture. Studies have focused on the ways in which terrorism is understood, narrated, socially constructed and communicated within particular fields, including the political field (see Chermak 2003; Jackson 2005; Winkler 2006; Jarvis 2009), the academic field (see Jackson 2007, 2009; Miller and Mills 2009; Stampnitsky forthcoming), the media field (see Nacos 2002; Al-Sumait, Lingle and Domke 2009; Altheide 2006), the security field (see Amoore & de Goede 2008; Heath-Kelly 2012), and the broader political culture (see Silberstein 2002; Croft 2006; Heller 2005). An important assertion within this literature is that as a consequence of the saturation of society with a set of common narratives, frames, metaphors and assumptions about the nature and causes of terrorism, particularly by power holders and influential actors, a dominant discourse of terrorism has been established and sedimented in social practice (see Jackson 2009; Croft 2006). The terrorism ‘regime of truth’, it is argued, provides members of the public with an accepted common-sense about terrorism, or a collective ‘grid of intelligibility’ through which to interpret events, and gives legitimacy to counter-terrorism measures enacted by the authorities. Importantly, assertions about the dominance of the terrorism discourse are rarely based on systematic empirical evidence regarding how the public perceive, understand and ‘know’ terrorism.
	The aim of this paper is to report on a study which examines empirically what members of the public ‘know’ about terrorism and counter-terrorism, and how they consume, mediate and narrate it as a subject of social discourse. As such, it represents a partial examination of the assertion that there exists a hegemonic discourse of terrorism today. In the following section, we locate our study within the existing literature on public opinion and public attitudes research, before outlining our theoretical and methodological approach. The third section reports on some of the main findings of the study, while the conclusion discusses some of the key implications we draw from the findings.

 
Mind the Gap: Research on Public Knowledge of Terrorism
As noted, while there is a large and growing literature on how elites – political, security, academic, media and cultural – understand and represent the subject of terrorism, there is no literature within these broadly discourse analytic approaches that we are aware of which examines how these discourses are received, consumed and mediated by members of the general public, or how the public understand and represent terrorism in their discourses. For the most part, these studies focus on one dimension of terrorism discourse – its discursive representation – and one direction of the relationship – from the elites to the public audience. The general failure to examine how discourses are received and consumed represents a major weakness and important lacuna within this broader literature. 
	Importantly, this is not to say that there are no empirical studies on public perceptions, attitudes and beliefs about aspects of terrorism and security issues from other perspectives. On the contrary, there is an extremely large survey and attitude studies literature which examines, among other things: public responses to the 9/11 attacks (see Woods 2011), including their effects on issues such as presidential approval (see Landau et al 2004; Ladd 2007); public perceptions of the terrorism threat (see Huddy et al 2002; Goodwin, Willson and Gains Jr 2005; Lemyre et al 2006; Stevens et al 2011); public attitudes towards Muslims after 9/11 (see Panagopoulos 2006); media effects on attitudes towards terrorism (see Keinan, Sadeh and Rosen 2003; Ridout, Grosse and Appleton 2008); and attitudes towards anti-terrorism measures (see Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2007), including the willingness to trade civil liberties for increased security (see Davis and Silver 2004). Related to this, there is a growing experimental literature which has examined the effects of emotions like anger and fear on attitudes towards terrorism (see Lerner et al 2003; Small, Lerner and Fischoff 2006). Finally, there is a small but growing interview-based and ethnographic literature which has begun to examine how members of the public and particular social groups such as Muslims understand their place as citizens within the contemporary security landscape and the war on terror (see Gillespie 2009; Jarvis and Lister 2010, forthcoming; Thomas and Sanderson 2011; Miller 2011; Noxolo and Huysmans 2009).
However, as valuable as these studies are to our understanding of some of the impacts of 9/11 and counter-terrorism measures on public opinion and attitudes, they have two main limitations relevant to our study. First, as far as we can ascertain, they do not examine in any significant detail what people know specifically about different aspects of terrorism, such as how it should be defined and understood in the first place, what its causes are, and how it should be responded to. Instead, most of these studies, when they do focus on terrorism specifically and not broader related security issues, tend to take terms like ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ for granted and then seek to examine one belief or a small cluster of related beliefs, such as attitudes towards the threat of terrorism. There are no studies that we are aware of which examine multiple aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism as a broader discourse with different assumptions, terms, narratives and discursive elements. This is surprising, not least because of the highly contested nature of the term, the well-known observation that a consensus on its definition has never been achieved and the deeply emotive nature of the subject.
Second, the terrorism-related psychology-based opinion and attitude studies are for the most part rooted in a cognitivist framework and employ surveys and experimental studies, which as we have noted, tend to focus on one single belief or a small cluster of related beliefs. Furthermore, as we note in the following sections, such methodologies are limited in their ability to capture the complex, dynamic, reflexive and inter-subjective nature of knowledge and belief. Such approaches can really only capture a temporally and contextually bound snapshot of what an individual ‘knows’ or believes at a given moment and in a specific context. In particular, such approaches cannot account for, or accommodate, inconsistencies and dissonance in beliefs and attitudes, or the way they often change during interaction with others, particularly when exposed to new information and ideas.




The approach we have adopted in this research is rooted broadly in Social Constructionism and Discourse Analysis, in particular, Critical Discourse Analysis (see Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). In addition, and more specifically, it draws heavily from Discursive Psychology (see Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 96-135; Wiggins and Potter 2007), aspects of Social Representation Theory (see Elcheroth, Doise and Reicher 2011), and other related research traditions such as Narrative Analysis (see Baker 2006). However, we do not want this research to be judged on how faithfully it adheres to one theoretical tradition or another, but rather on how useful the theoretical and methodological tools we have adopted are for investigating this particular topic.
Drawing from these approaches, we adopt a number of key assumptions and principles about the nature of knowledge and how we might study it more productively. First, in opposition to attitudinal research in which evaluative language is viewed primarily as a medium for accessing discrete and stable mental entities, we assume that knowledge, beliefs and attitudes are not separate from discourse but rather constituted in and through language and text (Wiggins and Potter 2007: 76). That is, discourse is both constructed and constructive (Ibid: 77). It is constructed through collectively shared linguistic resources such as words, categories, metaphors, narratives, repertoires and the like; and it is constructive in that it brings into being social realities like agreements, judgements, jokes, bets, crimes, authority, nations and the like. More specifically, just as people construct versions of the external world (events, actions, history, and the like) in and through their talk and texts, they also construct things in the mind (attitudes, feelings, expectations, dispositions, and the like) in and through language (see Edwards and Potter 1992). In other words, individuals do not walk around with pre-formed and stabilised attitudes, beliefs, and opinions about all manner of subjects which can then be produced on cue in objective language (in a survey, for example). Rather, they formulate and construct them through ways of talking, and employing the linguistic resources they have available to them in that context (Edwards 2005: 260).
Second, we assume that discourse and the knowledge, beliefs and attitudes it constructs is always situated or occasioned (Wiggins and Potter 2007: 77). Specifically, it is always situated in a particular institutional, social or material setting, such as a classroom, a job interview, a social occasion, a phone-call, a family mealtime, a press conference, or the like. Each setting provides its own opportunities and constraints for what can and cannot be said, as well its own norms, expectations and discursive structures. Discourse is also situated rhetorically within a particular discursive and argumentative framework (Ibid), which also enables and constrains what can be said, not least through sequencing and argumentative structures. In other words, discourse and the knowledge, attitudes and beliefs it expresses and constructs are always context-bound and thus temporally and spatially contingent (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 99). Individuals construct and express their knowledge, attitudes and beliefs interactively with and through the situation or context in which they are speaking. Consequently, they both shape and are shaped by the context in which they communicate. In order to understand a person’s knowledge of terrorism therefore, we need to examine it in situ, as it occurs interactively with its context and with others.  
In other words, in opposition to attitude research which treats attitudes as discrete and stable entities held in the minds of autonomous individuals, we assume that attitudes and beliefs are constructed through social interaction between people. That is, beliefs and knowledge are not isolated entities, but are formed and ‘constructed through social interaction between people in everyday life’ (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 100). In other words, they are part of larger collective systems of meaning. It is in this sense that we can conceive of knowledge as being inter-subjective and therefore living and dynamic, rather than fixed or static. In particular, what psychologists regard as attitudes can be more productively thought of as evaluations, assessments or arguments which ‘are sequentially organised within turn-taking and are the products of, rather than the precursors to, an interaction (Wiggins and Potter 2007: 76). This explains, in part, why individuals frequently express different opinions and attitudes about the same subject in different contexts and in conversation with different people, such as when they change their mind over the course of taking an opinion survey (see Fournier et al, 2011). 
A third related assumption important to our study is that discourse is a form of social action in and of itself – beyond simply viewing ‘talking’ or ‘writing’ as an action (Wiggins and Potter 2007: 77). Rather, discourse is the primary medium for social action and is performative and action-oriented: people both do things and as we have already mentioned, construct things through language. For example, in speaking people argue, oppose, resist, blame, justify, praise, and the like. Part of investigating a person’s knowledge of terrorism therefore, involves examining both what they are constructing through their talk and texts (the thing called ‘terrorism’, the ‘terrorist’, and the Self in relationship to it), and what actions they are performing – such as whether they are condemning, justifying, positioning, identifying or the like.
Fourth, drawing upon the assumptions described above and the insights of social representation theory, we recognise that knowledge is shared with others, and that ‘our ability to understand phenomena, and what they signify, depends upon drawing on shared bodies of knowledge which determine where the phenomena sits in the wider social world’ (Elcheroth, Doise and Reicher 2011: 732). These shared bodies of knowledge do not just exist in our minds, but also in material culture, such as books, films, museums, social practices, and the like (Ibid: 736). They provide an interpretive grid and a set of socially embedded frames which can be used to understand and interpret new phenomena. Thus, new knowledge is always anchored in existing stocks of knowledge. For example, the 9/11 attacks were interpreted and rooted in widely shared understandings of the attack on Pearl Harbor (see Rosenberg 2003; Jackson 2005). In addition, in order to find meaning and significance, individuals have to continually try to connect their personal ontological narratives with the social and national narratives which surround them (Baker 2006).




This research used in the first instance a focus group methodology (see Morgan 1996) as a means of generating conversational speech about terrorism and counter-terrorism. The focus group conversations were digitally recorded, transcribed and then analysed using thematic analysis, discourse analysis and aspects of conversation analysis. We believe that this approach is compatible with our theoretical assumptions and provides considerable methodological advantages over other commonly employed research methodologies. For example, overcoming atomistic sampling techniques and the formal and static expressions of belief engendered by survey research, this approach allows for, among other things: the analysis of individual knowledge and beliefs in vernacular conversation as opposed to survey research language; the analysis of flexibility, variation and dissonance in the discursive construction of beliefs and knowledge; the identification of shared sources of knowledge, collective narratives, cultural frames and rhetorical commonplaces employed to aid interpretation; the identification of key words, metaphors, assumptions, repertoires, grammatical forms and other shared forms of speech; the exploration of the social actions individuals undertake in speaking, such as assigning blame, praise, justification and the like; the ways in which individuals self-censor, justify or reflexively adjust their opinions on the basis of what they believe others think; and the broader kinds of meaning created in social interaction. Finally, this approach allows us to reflect on the ideological effects and consequences of the discourse and knowledge constructed through talk and text.
	The focus groups took a semi-structured approach in which the researcher ensured that all the themes on the interview schedule were covered, although not necessarily in the same order or employing the same formulations (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 121). The interview schedule involved a series of fairly open-ended questions about: the nature and definition of terrorism; the nature and extent of the terrorist threat; the causes of terrorism; the involvement of states in acts of terrorism (state terrorism); and the nature and effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures, including the use of torture. In discussing whether states could also be terrorists, the respondents were asked to discuss a series of scenarios based on real-life cases. The interview questions and scenarios were derived from earlier studies which had identified the core assumptions, narratives and beliefs about terrorism among political, media and academic elites; that is, the so-called dominant ‘discourse of terrorism’ (see, for example, Jackson 2005, 2007, 2009). This enabled us to assess the extent to which our interviewee’s views converged or diverged from the elite discourse of terrorism, thereby providing a level of evidence to assess the extent to which a hegemonic discourse or truth regime currently exists in relation to terrorism.




The focus group discussions resulted in more than 190 pages of typed text. Within this very large corpus of discourse, there were a great many interesting and important findings. We summarise some of the main findings here under three headings: key themes, forms and broad characteristics of the discourse; some common interpretive repertoires and cultural scripts used to comprehend the phenomenon of terrorism; and some of the main public narratives, rhetorical commonplaces and cultural frames employed in the texts.


Key Themes, Forms and Characteristics of Lay Terrorism Discourse
At the broadest level, we found there was a significant degree of convergence between the dominant assumptions and narratives of terrorism and counter-terrorism that has been well documented among political, media, security and academic elites (see Jackson 2005, 2007, 2009), and the laypersons we interviewed. For example, virtually all focus groups and the individuals within them agreed that: terrorism could be defined as the killing of innocent civilians; terrorism involved employing political violence to send a message to an audience; terrorism currently posed a serious security threat (although there were important qualification to this, as we explain below); weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism was a real threat; contemporary terrorism was primarily religious in nature; contemporary religious terrorism was a new kind of terrorism and different to the political terrorism of previous groups like the IRA; the causes of terrorism lay in religious extremism, individual vulnerability brought about by social exclusion, and poverty, among others; it was impossible to negotiate with today’s terrorists because they were religiously motivated; and there is a real and legitimate need to use coercive forms of counter-terrorism, including sometimes torture. These findings were expected and unsurprising, given their saturation of the media. These findings appear at first glance to confirm the notion that there is a hegemonic discourse of terrorism in society today.
	On the other hand, we also found a significant degree of divergence from the dominant discourse. For example, nearly all our interviewees exhibited great difficulties in distinguishing between war and terrorism, an important and surprising finding we discuss in more detail below. In addition, we found that while most of our interviewees accepted that terrorism was a major security threat, they did not feel personally threatened by terrorism and believed that the threat was largely confined to major cities like London. This is interesting because the dominant political and cultural narrative of the terrorism threat is that it is sudden and unpredictable, and can occur anywhere and at any time. A final major divergence from the dominant discourse was the acceptance by virtually every interviewee that states were also capable of committing acts of terrorism and therefore that state terrorism was a valid category. This is interesting, not least because the concept of state terrorism has yet to find widespread acceptance in the Terrorist Studies field (see Jackson 2008), or in the broader political and cultural fields. However, we also found that the notion of state terrorism simultaneously produced a great deal of dissonance, as we discuss in more detail below. 
	Broadly, in constructing their beliefs about terrorism, our interviewees most frequently employed passive discursive forms which discussed terrorism as a kind of exogenous phenomena that seemed to happen to people and societies – rather than employing active forms in which terrorism was committed by human agents. They also used primarily an emotional form of speech, in which strong feelings and intense emotions played an important role. This marked a real contrast with academic discourse on the subject, but perhaps mimicked much media and political discourse. Although we cannot go into detail, the interviewees also prominently employed identity-based forms of speech to construct clearly differentiated subjects – such as, ‘us’, ‘them’, ‘terrorists’, ‘our soldiers’, ‘the government’, ‘innocent civilians’, ‘Muslims’, ‘the West’, and the like – and the subject positions between them which regulated moral relationships – such as the surprisingly common support for security officials torturing terrorist suspects in order to save innocent lives, and the justification for holding prejudiced views of Muslims because of the involvement of Islam in the production of anti-Western terrorism. 
In a more substantive sense, one of our most important findings was that all our interviewees exhibited a great deal of both cognitive inconsistency (simultaneously making arguments or expressing viewpoints that were seemingly contradictory) and cognitive dissonance (recognising the incompatibility of arguments or viewpoints, but not wishing to jettison them and expressing difficulty in reconciling them). Some of the most important cognitive inconsistencies we found were as follows. First, it was not uncommon for our interviewees to accept that terrorists would indeed use WMD if they could, but then at the same time arguing that the terrorist threat is not nearly as great as it is made out to be by the media and politicians (see below for examples). Second, we noted a common acceptance of the notion that terrorists were brainwashed and religious fanatics, frequently followed by a rationalisation that terrorists are vulnerable and only use terrorism as a way to get out of poverty. The following except gives a flavour of how our interviewees typically negotiated this inconsistency:

Exp: 	Do they… terrorists psychologically unbalanced or abnormal or are they completely sane?
P1:	Some of them have been a little bit deranged. I think it’s a bit dismissive to say they are yeah, psychologically abnormal. No, I don’t think they are. Some of them are, but also some of them aren’t. Some of them have been, I think there was that guy, who had the shoe bomb, was it in America? I think he was bit soft in the head. Sandwich short of a picnic sort of fella. (P1, Focus Group 3, p.11, lines 12-16).

Here, we see a desire to believe that they are indeed deranged and psychologically abnormal, immediately followed by a rational assessment that they are not. This leads to first, rhetorical ambivalence (yes, they are, but then again, no, they’re not), followed by a narrative resolution which says that some are not, but some notably are.
A third common cognitive inconsistency was that nearly all our interviewees expressed trust in the government to provide security, while at the same time expressing deep scepticism of their motives and behaviour (see below for examples). 
Finally, perhaps the most important cognitive inconsistency we identified was a universal inability to distinguish between terrorism and war as morally and conceptually different types of political violence. In the first instance, our interviewees expressed how difficult it was to clearly distinguish between the two concepts, as the following excerpts show: 

I don’t know really. It’s hard to differentiate between war and terrorism because… (Focus Group 2, p.17, line 24).

Exp: 	What in your view makes terrorism different from other kinds of violence and activities, so things like war or just crime? If the aim is to create terror? How do you distinguish it from war, I guess, is a good starting place?
P1: 	Yeah, that’s a tough question to answer really because it is…
[…]
P1: 	I’m still having trouble answering that one ‘cause it is quite hard to find it between that and another form of war. (Focus Group 4, p.5, lines 3-15).

However, our interviewees went far beyond expressing difficulty in the conceptual distinction between war and terrorism. In fact, they went on to argue that war is a kind of terrorism, but just labelled differently, and that terrorism was a tool of warfare. This discursive construction is illustrated in the following excerpts:

We call it war but that’s what it is. On a bigger scale. (P1, Focus Group 5, p.24, line 1117).

How do we define war? Is it an act of terrorism or not? You can’t say it’s the same thing, 
but it’s very similar. You just put a legal hat on and, you know [inaudible] fight. (P1, 
Focus Group 5, p.2, lines 69-71).

Can I just say one last thing? I think you could probably argue that terrorism is modern warfare. (P1, Focus Group 1, page 6, line 9-10). 

Terrorism is a tool for war. I think what we are discussing here, just one tool used in a war. (P2, Focus Group 1, p.28, line 17).

Still, I don’t agree with that because nowadays, you hear about these people who’ve gone to training camps in Afghanistan and places like that and that’s like being in the army. It’s a structured training programme for them. It’s like you had a recruitment into an army and you get trained in warfare and different things like that, so, it literally is like joining the army. But it’s an army of terrorists rather than an army to protect your country. (P2, Focus Group 2, pp.5-6, lines 29-).

Why is it that the people in Afghanistan don’t see what we are doing is terrorism? If Afghanistan had planes and things they would be bombing us. It wouldn’t be called terrorism it would be called war. (P1, Focus Group 1, p.20, lines 43-45).

We considered this to be an important finding, not least because it is a clear divergence from the dominant discourse in which war and terrorism are conceptually and morally separated, for example, by notions of legitimate violence. In this respect, it represents a profound failure of elites and discursive power to create a moral demarcation between ‘our’ legitimate war-violence and ‘their’ illegitimate terrorist violence. In part, this may also be related to the inherent instability of the terrorism term itself. 
In addition to cognitive inconsistency, we also noted some important instances of cognitive dissonance, the most important of which surrounded the concept of state terrorism. For example, in answer to the interviewer’s question of whether the interviewee would accept a media report about an act of terrorism committed by a Western state, one interviewee replied: ‘I wouldn’t want to believe it. But, it’s possibly true.’ (P3, Focus Group 6, p.8, line 22). Similarly, in the following excerpt, the interviewee negotiates the unease they feel at the realisation that state terrorism is no different to non-state terrorism:

P1:	It isn’t any different at all to be honest. On the grand scheme of things.
P2:	Why the fuck would they do it really, otherwise?
P1:	I would only say it’s different because it’s the government that’s done it. Sorry to say, that’s the only reason I said that. Basically, it isn’t any different at all, it’s just another form of terrorism. I get sucked into the trap of just wanting to say it’s different.
[…]
P1:	Well, no, to be honest, I’m hating the fact that I said it was different now, ‘cause it’s not different at all ‘cause it is still terrorism. (Focus Group 4, p.19, lines 7-18).

We believe the dissonance produced by the notion of state terrorism most probably stems from the widespread normalisation of the state in society – the accepted belief that the state is legitimate and necessary for order and security. The notion that the state might engage in illegitimate and random violence against innocent civilians severely disturbs this internalised and materially embedded belief.
	Another important theme which emerged from the interviews was the key role played by uncertainty, unknowns and the lack of knowledge in the discursive field of terrorism. Moreover, our interviewees were acutely aware of the gaps in their own knowledge and made a conscious effort to negotiate the uncertainty carefully in constructing their opinions. For example, the phrases ‘I don’t know, but…’, ‘I’m not sure…’, and ‘I think…’ were ubiquitous throughout the interviews. As mentioned, this is an interesting finding given the saturation of society with terrorism knowledge through media coverage, education, and normalised everyday security practices. In part, our interviewees coped with this perennial uncertainty by dynamically constructing knowledge in situ. Such in situ knowledge construction, and the anxiety and reflexivity produced in the process, is discernible in the following extracts: 

I’m trying to think. Um… as for Mafia, it is an act of terrorism. Yeah, definitely. It’s the same with the gangs. It is an act of terrorism. But again, it’s something in between… I’m trying to think an example. (P1, Focus Group 5, p.23, lines 1062-1064).

Yeah, I am aren’t I? I’m thinking about it more. (P1, Focus Group 3, p.9, line 12). 

I think if you are… there are many answers to that really… let’s have a think… (P1, Focus Group 3, p.11, line 33). 

Yeah, it depends what the government is. Where they’re from. No, it doesn’t really… I don’t know. It’s a hard one to say… (P1, Focus Group 3, p.16, lines 3-4).

I think there’s a lot of things kept secret. Really, I think [you’ve probably] contradicted most of our views. Well, I know I’ve probably contradicted most of my views. I don’t actually understand it. I don’t know the facts. That’s the other thing you have as well, you’ve got to [ask yourself] is that actually true. (P2: Focus Group 4, p.12, lines 13-16). 

Interestingly, in many cases, the lack of knowledge is directly related to a deep distrust of the media as an authoritative source of information – as the following excerpts show:

I think the media has a great part in it. They make it bigger than it already is. […] …it doesn’t happen as much as they make you believe. (P1, Focus Group 5, p.4, lines 163, 177-78).

It depends what sort of information you mean. I think the fact is the media sort of create the terror almost as much as terrorists do. And I think that it’s made too much up a lot of the time when there is no fear. Nothing to fear. But information that security like MI5 would know, I don’t think we know a lot of the stuff that goes on. (P3, Focus Group 1, p.31, lines 22-25).

There’s a lot of other stuff going on in the planet that we don’t hear about and I worry about the source that we are hearing it from, like the news media, only put in certain things they want to put in. (P1, Focus Group 4, p.27, lines 5-7).

But everything in that can be controlled as well, you know, so it’s not as though… anybody can be paid off to do something. There’s no guarantee that everything you’re getting on the news or in the newspaper is one hundred percent true, or that you’re getting all of the facts. Or that you’re even getting the stories. (P2, Focus Group 4, p.27, lines 18-21).

This is interesting, especially given the central role the media plays in providing lay people with information about terrorism, security and foreign affairs in the first place.
At the same time, our interviewees demonstrate a fairly sophisticated understanding of the role and power of labelling in this situation of knowledge uncertainty and discursive flexibility. Importantly, some of our interviewees were also aware of what such labelling permits in relation to responding to terrorism, as the following excerpts show: 

I think you have to be clear about the… categorising terrorists because if you start talking about political activists you start becoming, you know, the sort of 1984 style, categorising one thing or another, and then, it gives you a basis to act against it. So if you are categorising political protestors as terrorists, like what the Syrian government’s doing at the moment, it almost legitimises them shooting at the, or killing them, or whatever. (P2, Focus Group 6, p.4, lines 1-6).

I think the trouble… I don’t want to say everything is terrorism because every act of violence has an element on terror to it, you know, even a mugging in the street is giving people fear and terror, but that’s not terrorism. So, I think you have to be careful when you’re defining it and what you’re going to call terrorism. I suppose. You know, I may be wrong completely, but that’s my… (P2, Focus Group 6, p.32, lines 38-42).

P1:	It’s media produced as well. I mean, if the media says they’re terrorists…
P3:	…they’re terrorists.
P1:	…they’re defined as terrorists. If the media says… (Focus Group 6, p.7, lines 25-29).

Importantly, the uncertainty and lack of knowledge, and the deep awareness of the role of media in producing influential representations based on labelling most frequently produced a deep sense of powerlessness on the part of our interviewees – as the following excerpt shows:

I think people should be, yeah, but then, will they be? If something is covered up through the papers and stuff, how can you make everyone aware? (P2, Focus Group 4, p.28, lines 32-33).

The importance of this is that it suggests that the recognition of labelling processes and the (uncertain) role of the media in constructing images of terrorism is not necessarily empowering, liberating or motivating of political action. Instead, individuals appear to see no real way out of the knowledge impasse. At a broad level, this suggests that the ideological power of a discourse is not dependent on its internal consistency or stability, or even the trust-worthiness of its speakers – if it also produces a sense of atomistic helplessness and powerlessness. 


Interpretive Repertoires and Cultural Scripts
In this section, we summarise some of the main interpretive repertoires and cultural scripts that our interviewees constructed in their discourse on terrorism. Following Discursive Psychology, we conceive of interpretive repertoires as ‘clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images’ (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 90). Repertoires provide discursive resources that people can use to construct versions of reality and make sense of phenomena (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 107).
	A first key interpretive narrative commonly employed in the text was what we refer to as ‘the terrorist as vulnerable victim’ repertoire. In this conception, terrorists are naïve, childish, unstable or in some way vulnerable, and are victimised by other more devious and manipulative individuals to behave in ways they otherwise might not. The following excerpts illustrate this repertoire:

Yeah. Naïve or childish I’d also put in as well, because they are easily led by the main people that control all these, minions, as it were, that never seem to do a suicide themselves. (P1, Focus Group 4, p.2, lines 25-27).

… He was mentally unstable. He’d been, he had a carer and stuff, so I think using that sort of person is going after the vulnerable. I think a lot of the time the guys that are orchestrating it are not the same guys that are committing the acts that… (P2, Focus Group 6, p.13, lines 34-37).

And that’s why I think some of these people are vulnerable. (P3, Focus Group 6, p.20, lines 26-27).

A related second interpretive repertoire common to the interviews was the ‘brainwashed terrorist’ repertoire. This repertoire relies on a culturally prevalent myth of weak-minded individuals who are psychologically ‘brainwashed’ into a zombie-like state of obedience to a diabolical mastermind and then commanded to do things they otherwise would never do. The following excerpts illustrate this repertoire: 

Well, it’s very easy. (Laughs). Um… the way they reason with you… these preachers or leaders, or whatever. Um… they know what tactics to use to make you believe. And no matter how educated you are it is possible to brainwash you. (P1, Focus Group 5, p.10, lines 430-432).

Like I said, people are usually brainwashed. That’s the way… that’s the process basically. (P1, Focus Group 5, p.11, line 503).

… and they’re brainwashing children from such a young age, they don’t know any different. (P1, Focus Group 2, p.9, line 7).

I don’t think they are the victims… yeah, to some degree you could say they were victims, but… everyone has free will, and everyone should have the intellect to decide what’s right and wrong. If they let themselves be brainwashed then maybe they are as bad as the brainwasher. But then they just turn into a brainwasher themselves for someone else. So… (P1, Focus Group 3, p.7, lines 1-4).

Interestingly, both of these first two repertoires function to remove agency from the terrorists, transforming them into a kind of victim rather than a perpetrator. We can speculate that this represents, in part, a strategy of rationalisation to reconcile the way in which some fellow human beings are able to undertake brutal violence against other fellow innocent human beings.
	Another common interpretive repertoire employed in the interviews was the ‘human nature as inherently and eternally violent’ repertoire. This was also related to, and often employed alongside, the ‘war is hell’ repertoire. 

My view is they’re right to be doing what they’re doing, and if there’s casualties of war there’s casualties of war then. At the end of the day they’re doing a thing to rid the… well they’re never, ever going to rid the world of terrorism, but they’re trying to rid the world of people who believe that terrorism is a good thing, basically, and if there’s casualties there’s casualties. (P2, Focus Group 2, p.6, lines 30-34).

I’d just like to see it all finishing, I tell you. But I don’t think it will ever because religion is too strong. (P3, Focus Group 7, p.19, lines 8-9).

It’s just war. Soldiers have to fight and inevitably the nature of war is that civilians do get killed in a war zone. It’s the fact it is a war zone and it’s specified, that area is a war zone and it happens in it, I guess, is because of the war, whereas terrorism seems to have to act outside those remits. (P3, Focus Group 1, p.28, lines 1-4).

It is arguable that these might more accurately be considered public narratives (Baker 2006). However, they do not appear to be as prevalent as other public narratives, so we consider them under the repertoire heading. In any case, they provide interpretive frames which function to construct terrorism as an inherent feature of society, while also more broadly justifying war (including war against terrorism) as sometimes necessary and legitimate. They also, as before, function to remove agency and construct war and terrorism as something that happens, rather than something which individual agents do to other human beings.
	A third interpretive repertoire or cultural script employed by our interviewees was the ‘government conspiracy’ repertoire. Within this surprisingly common frame or script, a great deal of the ambiguity and uncertainty which characterises knowledge in the terrorism field is attributed to the secret machinations of powerful governments who manipulate events and even fly false flags of terrorism. Not surprisingly, the most common conspiracy theory is that the American government was involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The following excerpts illustrate this repertoire:

That our tax money maintains, and all sorts of things like, if the reason we’re in Afghanistan is because the government don’t, I don’t believe this but, if the government caused the two towers and caused the chain of events to occur, if the government blew up the twin towers, then that is state terrorism. (P1: Focus Group 1, p.27, lines 30-33).

[…] But, it wouldn’t surprise me if certain sectors of the government had their way of doing it of selling them the guns just so then they can go and have a pop at them. (P2, Focus Group 4, p.8, lines 30-32).

P1:	[…] You know like what I was saying about the two towers coming down, it was quite convenient that they came down when they had to be taken down in a few years later anyway to the cost of the American government where they actually gained like 30 billion or something like that, in revenue over the top of it, where it would have cost them probably the same to take it down.
Exp:	I hadn’t heard that one.
P1:	Go onto a website called ‘Small Change’ on the internet and it’s got this whole piece... […] …the bit where the plane hit, all of them had been given two weeks holiday for no reason, well for the reason was to re-do the place but there was no workers there, they weren’t working there and the people that were in that part had two weeks off, so no casualties were done from the Pentagon whatsoever. Which was a bit weird. It makes you ask questions. (Focus Group 4, p.30, lines 8-22).

Importantly, this cultural repertoire produced a deep ambivalence where, despite distrust, scepticism and the belief that governments may be involved in terrorism, our interviewees were nonetheless forced to trust them for security. As one interviewee expressed it,

I feel like we’ve got to trust the government and the security services. But we don’t know what they’re doing to trust them, which I suppose is what, why people are perhaps in fear, where maybe if people were of what they were doing… (P3, Focus Group 6, p.23, lines 31-34).
 
	A final interpretive repertoire we noted in the interviews, and one which is also common to both the terrorism studies field, and parts of the broader popular political culture, is that terrorism is in large part the result of unregulated immigration by the UK government. In this formulation, terrorism is the UK’s own fault for being so liberal and accommodating; terrorism, in other words, results from cultural weakness. The following excerpts clearly illustrate this repertoire:

I mean, we live in a very liberal country. We let people in from all over the place and then those people that come in, or have come in, are going to go for the Islamic side again. They’ve been let in and they have, and I don’t know if they still do, have had mosques that have preached terror and there are people that are more susceptible and there are DVDs and CDs that you can buy with some, what do you call them? … Imam that is also preaching terror on why to fight against the West, and why fight against the infidels, or whatever they call it. And… I think if it weren’t such a liberal society letting these people in and letting them do as they want then they wouldn’t have such a freedom to do it. And maybe we’re overly liberal in some respects. (P1, Focus Group 3, p.6, lines 10-18).

We are one of the easiest countries in the world to get into! (P1, Focus Group 7, p.15, lines 13-14).

As before, this repertoire is employed to construct a particular kind of world, one where the terrorism phenomena can be explained and contextualised within a broader symbolic order which gives meaning to actions and events.


Public Narratives, Rhetorical Commonplaces and Cultural Frames
As we have already noted, in constructing knowledge and beliefs, people draw upon public narratives, cultural frames and rhetorical commonplaces available to them in the collective cultural and institutional context. They employ them as a means to comprehend, interpret and make meaningful events and phenomena. One of our interesting findings was that interviewees made frequent references to films and television shows as frames through which to interpret the terrorism field, indicating the degree to which news and entertainment media interact in the production of collective understandings of current events. In our interviews, the following films and television shows were all referenced, some more than once: Spooks, The Punisher, Shooting Dogs, Blood Diamonds, Body of Lies, Not Without My Daughter, and Fight Club. Unsurprisingly, several of these films contain powerful representations of terrorists and terrorism.
	However, the most commonly employed public narrative employed as an interpretive frame for terrorism and the war on terrorism was the World War II narrative. Every single focus group and nearly every one of our interviewees made direct reference to this narrative and spoke liberally about the Blitz, Hitler, the Third Reich, Hiroshima, the Japanese Kamikazi and other related aspects of World War II in their answers to questions about terrorism. The following excerpts illustrate how this narrative was used to interpret current terrorist issues:

Exp:	What about in terms of war? How is it different to what happens in war? 
Terrorism.
P1:	How much is it different to what happens in war? Ok, so we think of, initially I think of say World War 1, World War 2. And you’ve got two armies that have some sort of organisation where they are going to fight each other. They are going to have a fight and they are going to go to battle. If you’ve got an Islamic terrorist, a terrorist of any sort, I don’t think they tend to have a fight, ‘cause they know a one-on-one fight they’re going to lose so their war is a different kind of war. (Focus Group 3, pp.2-3, lines 30-).

Germany was terrorism because Hitler had a dislike for Jewish people so he gassed them all. That’s terrorism because it is just taking people’s lives and terrorising all the other Jews throughout the country. (P2, Focus Group 2, p.17, lines 8-10).

In these examples, we can see how WWII is directly employed as an interpretive frame to distinguish between war and terrorism, as well as how it is used to construct what terrorism is. Importantly, for our interviewees, the WWII narrative is the first and most resonant frame that comes to mind when asked questions about war and terrorism.
A second important cultural frame derives from the way in which previous notable terrorist attacks have been constructed. The public narratives constructed around these events then become part of the interpretive frame through which the terrorism field is structured and constituted. In the interviews, every single focus group made numerous references to the events of 9/11, 7/7, the terrorism campaign of the IRA, and other prominent terrorist events. As one interview put it, when one thinks about terrorism, ‘The first thing that always comes to mind is the 9/11 thing’ (P1, Focus Group 4, p.1, line 5). Interestingly, in the United Kingdom at least, the 7/7 attacks appears to have produced an image of a Muslim person with a backpack as the essential representative terrorist. A significant number of interviewees made direct reference to this image, as the following excerpts illustrate:  
 
… obviously not every fucking single person with a backpack, you know, Asian person with a backpack is going to blow you up, there’s still always, since 9/11, and also the stuff that went on in London as well, it is always I think, a thought that just flickers it through your mind. Even if you don’t want it to. (P2, Focus Group 4, p.3, lines 33-36).

… You know, not every single person you see on the train with a backpack is going to blow you up. (P2: Focus Group 4, p.23, lines 13-14). 

	A third public narrative characteristic of our interviewees, and one which interestingly derives from mainly left-wing opponents of the war on terror and in particular the wars in the Middle East, is the narrative of oil politics/wars. Nearly every focus group made reference to the importance of oil in understanding contemporary terrorism, and in most cases, employed it as an explanatory factor for why conflict in the form of terrorism and war was currently occurring. The following excerpts illustrate the way this narrative was typically used:

P3:	They want to own their own oil? I guess.
P1:	But we don’t want to let them own their own oil.
P3:	I don’t know.
P1:	Exactly. Yeah, I know. If it’s for the oil we shouldn’t have gone in the first place. 
(Focus Group 1, p. 18, lines 12-18).

Exp: 	Can I just ask you, what do you think started all the terrorism?
P2: 	I have no idea at all.
P1:	Oil, money.
Exp:	Can you put a time frame on this, or when do you think it all started?
P1:	When they found oil in the first place. That’s when it started the dispute and then 	it’s just gone from then onwards. […]
[…]
Exp:	So, even in response to 9/11 you still think it’s about oil?
P1:	Yes, I think so. I think it’s basically America needs a foothold where the oil is. They need to take over one of these places and have their political power over there so they can do whatever they want with it. […] 
(Focus Group 4, p.11, lines 9-30).

	A fourth cultural frame or rhetorical commonplace (expressed as a metaphor) we noted in the interviews was the notion that politics – and by extension terrorism and war – was a ‘dirty game’. The following excerpt, which actually refers to the possibility of state involvement in an act of terrorism, illustrates the way this metaphorical commonplace was used to interpret the notion of state terrorism:

P2: 	It’s a dirty game, isn’t it?
P1:	It’s terrorism.
P2:	That is being completely dishonest.
P3:	It’s acting like a terrorist but not… being… yeah.
	(Focus Group 1, p.24, lines 35-41).

Interestingly, this metaphor once again functions to reduce agency and responsibility by placing the blame on the ‘game’, which is inherently ‘dirty’. The implication here is that politics and terrorism require dirty play in order to win, and the actors cannot be blamed because they are merely playing by the established rules.
A fifth cultural frame we noted in the text, which by now may also be a public narrative, is the notion that suicide bombers are motivated by the future reward of virgins in paradise. A significant number of focus groups articulated this narrative frame as a probable explanation for terrorism. The following excerpts illustrate the usage of this particular frame:

…a suicide bomber would be less likely to blow himself up just to prove a point if he didn’t believe if there’d be like 72 virgins when he died, or something, and there’s a better life afterwards. (P1, Focus Group 1, p. 13, lines 6-7).

Yeah, well I’d definitely agree with deluded because there’s all that theory of you get so many virgins in heaven if you do this, and… yeah. (P1, Focus Group 4, p.2, lines 15-16).

This narrative frame is most often employed within a broader discussion of the religious roots of terrorism and ‘Islamic terrorism’. As such, it demonstrates convergence with the dominant discourse, and similarly functions to de-politicise and demonise the terrorist other (see Jackson 2007). In our interviews, it is most often followed by the argument that political negotiations with terrorists are impossible today, a clear ideological outcome of this particular discursive formation.
	A final characteristic of the discourse we want to highlight is that virtually all the focus groups were deeply ambivalent about whether the tactic of hijacking constituted an act of terrorism. The following excerpts illustrate the typical ambivalence we encountered about this issue:

P2:	[inaudible]… though ‘cause it is still hijacking a plane and it’s still terrifying a lot of people that were on the plane. I think it’s close but not exactly…
[…]
P2:	It’s still hijacking a plane though, isn’t it? If you do it with a gun and you’ve got a whole load of people that are aware that they are being flown very much away from their destination, they’re all terrified. I’d say it’s terrorism but [inaudible]…
(Focus Group 4, p.18, lines 17-25).

Exp:	I guess, really, I could ask it differently. Do you think hijacking is a terrorist…?
P1:	Not always, not always. There have in my experience, there have been people who are trying to escape from a country because their life is in danger so they hijack a plane and, you know, to take them somewhere safe, so they can seek asylum. That’s happened as well. It’s not terrorism necessarily. (Focus Group 5, p.21, lines 937-942).





In this paper, we have employed Discursive Psychology and a number of related approaches to analyse the talk and text of lay persons in relation to their knowledge and beliefs about the field of terrorism. Among others, there are some important conclusions and implications which can be derived from the research.
	First, in a limited and fairly exploratory sense, we have attempted to examine the lacuna in the literature on terrorism discourse, namely, the gap between the representation of terrorism in elite discourse and the way such representations are received and consumed by the lay public. Our tentative conclusion based on the findings presented here is that the dominant discourse is perhaps not as dominant as most scholars of the terrorism discourse assume. Rather, it is far less coherent, far less stable and far more variegated than the monolithic hegemony it is often made out to be, and there are some important areas of divergence. At the very least, the observation that lay people struggle to distinguish between war and terrorism, despite the vast public efforts which governments and other social actors put into constructing clear demarcation lines between legitimate and illegitimate political violence, shows that there is a major fault-line or source of instability in the discourse. 
At the same time, we have discovered that these weaknesses do not necessarily diminish the power of the discourse to sustain a hegemonic politics and set of counter-terrorism practices, as the uncertainty, instability and unknowns of the discourse nonetheless have thus far produced in our subjects at least, a sense of powerlessness that appears to work against active political resistance or counter-hegemonic struggle. Most of our interviewees fully understood the role of labelling in the construction of terrorism, and were highly sceptical of both the media and the government, but were nonetheless resigned to accepting that the government had to be trusted to keep the public safe from terrorism.  
	Second, our findings tell us a number of important things about public opinion in general and opinion about terrorism specifically. For example, they confirm that public opinion or beliefs are not static or pre-formed, but dynamic and frequently constructed in situ in conversation with others. Moreover, people most often hold contradictory views and experience frequent cognitive dissonance in their beliefs, particularly it seems in relation to the terrorism field. At the same time, they have a number of discursive strategies and interpretive frames which they can employ to mediate and reconcile these inconsistencies. This clearly has important implications for the study of public opinion more broadly, but also for future studies of terrorism knowledge. We believe it also reflects the often deeply flawed nature of the discourse itself, in which terrorism exists as a floating signifier and is an ‘essentially contested concept’, and there are deep inconsistencies in the discourse about its nature, threat and causes (see Jackson et al 2011). 
Related to this, the study’s findings also confirm that people do indeed draw upon and construct interpretive repertoires, cultural frames, public narratives and metaphors as lenses through which to construct their understanding of the phenomena under discussion. An important implication of this finding is that, as a number of scholars have suggested (see, for example, McDonald and Merefield 2010; Holland 2010), when elites effectively frame their political appeals in terms of certain public narratives and cultural frames – particularly the mythology of World War II, the 9/11 narrative, notions of religious terrorism, and the like – they are tapping into a powerful set of culturally embedded interpretive frames which lay people readily access and employ in their daily talk and text. This means that elite political appeals are far more likely to resonate with the public, at least implicitly, which in turn also means they are less likely (and more difficult) to oppose and resist.  
Finally, a key finding of our research is that in some areas – in this case, terrorism – the researcher plays a not insignificant role in interviewee knowledge construction through the introduction of novel formulations and language use, unanticipated questions and new thought-provoking scenarios. In particular, we found that simply asking whether interviewees believed that states could also be terrorists, and then presenting a series of scenarios based on real cases, provided them with a perspective they had rarely or never been presented with before. This forced them to reason out their beliefs in situ. Importantly, when presented with this novel notion, almost all interviewees compared the definition of terrorism they had adopted with the state actions described and quickly concluded that there was no substantive difference between state and non-state terrorism. This forced them to accept that state terrorism was a valid category, even if it simultaneously disturbed their notions of state legitimacy. 
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